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SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE
INTERACTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS CONVENTIONS WITH A PROPOSED
TREATY ON PANDEMICS
DIEGO RODRÍGUEZ-PINZÓN*
I have been invited to talk about the call to action for pandemics
and international law. I want to approach this from an international
human rights law perspective, which is my area of expertise. I would
like to touch upon a few selected issues of this complex interaction.
First, I believe international human rights law and its international
machinery are exceptionally relevant to any effort by the
international community to develop a comprehensive international
instrument on epidemics and pandemics.1 It is a particularly wellsettled field of international law with a sophisticated implementation
machinery and a wide array of supervisory mechanisms.
This field of international law is also particularly well integrated
with the constitutional and legal systems of several states that have
incorporated these international standards as part of their juridical
systems. There are many ways in which these standards have
developed an intense relationship with national law. For example,
some states refer to them as a “constitutional block” indicating that
international human rights norms are part of the constitutional

* The author is member of the United Nations Committee Against Torture. He is
Professorial Lecturer in Residence at American University Washington College of
Law and Co-Director of the Academy on Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law in the same institution. The author would like to thank Lena
Raxter for her research support in this article.
1. See generally Natalie Samarsinghe, Human Rights: Norms and Machinery,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws,
eds., 2d ed. 2018) (noting the United Nation’s role in creating the international
human rights system and considering opportunities for norm development and
institutional advances).
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framework and carry their supreme authority.2 Others incorporate
these norms through national implementing legislation.3 Therefore, it
is very important to refer to relevant international human rights law
when designing specific provisions in an international instrument
regarding pandemics and epidemics, considering that such human
rights norms are already alive in domestic law in many domestic
systems.4
I would like to approach this question from a two-fold perspective
when we deal with these international human rights regimes, as I
believe international human rights law has a dual interaction with the
proposed effort on pandemics. First of all, I must refer to the
arguments that stress the need to have state action controlling,
confronting, and preventing pandemics.5 International human rights
standards reinforce these obligations, which states may have under
customary international law and other international instruments.6
International human rights obligations consider and recognize
2. See, e.g., Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional
Law in Latin America: Trends and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1592 (2011)
(providing that in Latin America, a common feature of constitutional reform is the
openness of domestic legal systems to international human rights law).
3. See
Implementation,
ICELANDIC
HUM.
RTS.
CTR.,
https://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rightsconcepts-ideas-and-fora/part-i-the-concept-of-human-rights/implementation (last
visited May 26, 2021) (explaining implementation of international human rights
law at the domestic level).
4. See generally International Human Rights Law, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMM’R
FOR
HUM.
RTS.,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx
(last
visited May 26, 2021) (indicating that most states formally protect basic human
rights in their constitutions and other laws).
5. See, e.g., David Cooper & Jaimie Worker, The Coronavirus Pandemic
Requires State and Local Policymakers to Act, in Addition to Demanding a Strong
Federal Response, WORKING ECON. BLOG. (Mar. 17, 2020, 11:41 AM),
https://www.epi.org/blog/the-coronavirus-pandemic-requires-state-and-localpolicymakers-to-act-in-addition-to-demanding-a-strong-federal-response
(emphasizing the need for strong state action to adequately and holistically address
the pandemic).
6. See generally International Standards and Principles, U.N. OFF. OF THE
HIGH
COMM’R
FOR
HUM.
RTS.,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/olderpersons/pages/internationalstandards.aspx
(last visited May 26, 2021) (explaining the existing international human rights
standards and principles).
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substantive rights that imply correlative duties to states, such as the
duty to respect the right to life, the right to personal integrity, and the
right to health, among other relevant rights.7
These international human rights law regimes pursue many of the
same objectives that the efforts to develop an international
instrument to manage pandemics are pursuing. There is a
complementary and mutually reinforcing relationship between
international human rights law and the proposed instrument.8
Moreover, it is important to remember that the generic obligations
under international human rights law call states to ensure the rights I
just mentioned, and these positive obligations are essential for the
effort of preventing pandemics.9 Such a notion of prevention can
compel states to adopt measures that states are arguably obliged to
follow under international human rights treaties.10 For example,
adequate medical services are required under certain circumstances
as part of general obligations that states have under certain
international human rights treaties.11 They work in congruence with
7. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966; 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
8. See Haik Nikogosian & Ilona Kickbusch, The Case for an International
Pandemic Treaty, 372 B.M.J. 1, 1–2 (2021) (arguing that an international
pandemic treaty would protect human rights).
9. See, e.g., Human Rights Dimension of COVID-19 Response, HUM. RTS.
WATCH
(Mar.
19,
2020,
12:01
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19response (“International human rights law guarantees everyone the right to the
highest attainable standard of health and obligates governments to take steps to
prevent threats to public health and to provide medical care to those who need it.”).
10. Many treaties refer to the obligation of states to undertake judicial or other
measures to protect life, personal integrity, and health. See ICCPR, supra note 7,
art. 6; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 2, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Council of Europe, Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1940, Eur.
T.S. No. 5; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 16, June 27, 1981,
1520 U.N.T.S. 217; cf. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter UNCAT] (defining and prohibiting torture, which violates the right to
life, personal integrity, and health).
11. ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 12; Economic and Social Council, General
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 12),
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
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states’ efforts to confront pandemics.
A second dimension I would like to briefly discuss is the notion
dealing with the consequences of a breach of international human
rights law obligations. This particular breach could entail the
violation of, for example, the right to life and the right to personal
integrity and health in the context of a pandemic.12 If a state fails to
act diligently in confronting an outbreak that reaches the level of a
pandemic, there are certain legal consequences for those breaches.13 I
would like to focus on the duty to redress such breaches.14 This duty
requires that a state found in breach of its international human rights
obligations be legally compelled to secure restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, assurances of non-repetition, and satisfaction.15 Within
the multiple aspects that the duty to redress entails, it is important to
highlight the duty to rehabilitate the victims of human rights
violations.16 This duty is particularly relevant in the specific context
of pandemics, where such a duty should include the provision of
medical services, psychosocial support, and other comprehensive
health services.
It is very important to keep in mind that human beings are the
ultimate beneficiaries of these rights. Human rights provisions are
12. See, e.g., Human Rights Dimension of COVID-19 Response, supra note 9
(providing an overview of the human rights concerns caused by COVID-19).
13. See generally Martin Paparinskis, COVID-19 Claims and the Law of
International Responsibility, 11 J. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 311
(2020) (considering the role of state responsibility in addressing claims and
disputes about COVID-19). But see Sienho Yee, To Deal with a New Coronavirus
Pandemic: Making Sense of the Lack of Any State Practice in Pursuing State
Responsibility for Alleged Malfeasances in a Pandemic—Lex Specialis or Lex
Generalis, 19 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 237, 237 (2020) (commenting on the absence
of state practice in holding states responsible for alleged malfeasances in
pandemics).
14. See International Health Regulations, May 23, 2005, 2509 U.N.T.S. 79;
Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
U.N. Doc. A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4, 2001-II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, at arts. 1–3
(2001).
15. United Nations Committee Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, General Comment No. 3 (2012):
Implementation of Article 14 by States Parties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 (2012).
16. See G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/147, ¶ 18 (Mar. 21, 2006)
(providing that victims of gross violations of human rights law should be provided
with full and effective reparation, including rehabilitation).
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interpreted in a specific manner regarding certain vulnerable
communities and populations. The non-discrimination principle
serves as an example.17 Persons deprived of liberty, older persons,
racial and ethnic minorities, women, children, persons with
disabilities, and LGBTI+ communities are all particularly vulnerable
in the circumstances of a pandemic, and consequently have
heightened and specific protections under several international
human rights treaties.18
The third dimension is the limits on state measures adopted in the
context of pandemics that should answer the following question: how
are states supposed to carry out their effort of controlling and
preventing pandemics without violating human rights law? A
comprehensive set of international norms is already in place to guide
us in answering this question, in a two-fold approach. On the one
side, you have the possibility of derogation and suspension of certain
rights under several human rights treaties.19 On the other side exists
the possibility of restrictions or limitations of certain rights when the
state considers it necessary to adopt measures to confront the
pandemic that could interfere in the exercise of those rights by
persons under their jurisdiction.20
I will not go into details about the test states have to comply with
to implement permissible or lawful limitations or restrictions of
human rights. However, I want to mention that there is a debate in
17. See Non-Discrimination: Groups in Vulnerable Situations, U.N. OFF.

THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.,

OF

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Health/Pages/GroupsInVulnerableSituations.asp
x (last visited May 26, 2021) (discussing the non-discrimination principle).
18. There are many categories of persons that require specific and very
nuanced measures as illustrated in standards developed in international case-law,
country and thematic reports, general comments, and concluding observations,
under several international human rights treaties.
19. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 19 (allowing the right to freedom of
expression to be restricted if necessary “(a) for respect of the rights or reputations
of others” or “(b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals”). See generally Diane Orentlicher, Ensuring
Access to Accurate Information and Combatting Misinformation about Pandemics,
36 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 969, 1076-86 (2021) (discussing the freedom of
expression—and its limitations—in the context of misinformation surrounding the
COVID-19 pandemic).
20. ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 4.
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the academic community of several countries and regions regarding
the appropriate type of approach when confronting a pandemic and
having to choose between suspension or restriction of certain rights
under human rights law.21 Some aspects discussed in this debate
about the selection of an appropriate approach to these situations
refer, for example, to the level of supervision, and what would allow
for closer judicial or international scrutiny of such measures.22 In
this regard, it would be important to keep in mind that restrictions of
rights remain in place as long as they are necessary and proportional,
and they are subject to permanent scrutiny by national courts that
could review their lawfulness.23 Of course, the international
machinery is also available with its individual complaint mechanisms
that allow for further review to take place in international venues.24
Furthermore, such national and international bodies may allow for a
closer review of the legality of the restrictions, granting less
deference to national authorities in the implementation of such
measures.25 Arguably, this provides a better supervisory regime of
those restriction measures than suspension of rights, which may be
subject to laxer scrutiny that confers more deference to national
authorities making such determinations.
On the other hand, the temporal nature of suspensions exposes
21. Sébastien Touzé, The Restriction Will Always Be Better than the
Exemption . . . (2020). For further discussion on suspension of rights in the context
of COVID-19, see generally Audrey Lebret, COVID-19 Pandemic and
Derogations to Human Rights, 7 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 1 (2020),
https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/7/1/lsaa015/5828398.
22. See, e.g., Lebret, supra note 21, at 15 (concluding that international human
rights courts will scrutinize the necessity of certain measures and determine
whether less severe measures could have achieved the same result).
23. See id. at 8 (asserting the importance that parliaments and national judges
have the capacity to scrutinize the necessity and proportionality of government
measures).
24. See
INTER-STATE
COMPLAINTS,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Petitions/Pages/InterStateComplaints.aspx
(last visited Apr. 22, 2021); HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES – INDIVIDUAL
COMMUNICATIONS
[hereinafter
INDIVIDUAL
COMMUNICATIONS],
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/tbpetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.a
spx (last visited Apr. 22, 2021).
25. INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 24 (describing how
complainants may seek recourse under international law for perceived violations of
their rights caused by state-imposed restrictions).
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them to stricter control on its temporal validity. Some indeed argue
that derogations, being temporary, could be more appropriate, as they
are tailored to the specific emergency and will expire once they are
no longer required to confront the crisis.26 However, review of core
aspects of suspensions, such as the reasons to declare the emergency,
appear to benefit from less strict control by affording a broader
margin of appreciation to the local authorities.27 In general,
restrictions or limitations of rights are governed by a proportionality
requirement.28 Such proportionality implies that once the restricting
measure is not necessary it will have to be rescinded.29 In other
words, to a certain extent, they are also temporary in the context of a
pandemic. They must be periodically assessed in order to determine
whether they remain appropriate under the proportionality
requirement.30 This consideration strengthens the argument that, in
most situations in the context of pandemics, it is not necessary to
resort to suspension or derogation of human rights to the extent that
restrictions and limitations can achieve the desired result.

SOME ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON THE TOPIC
Regarding the question posed by one of the participants in this
panel about identifying the consequences of the international legal
obligations and mechanisms to guarantee access to medical facilities,
I would like to approach it with a very specific example.
There are many tools that allow the international community to
directly monitor places where persons are deprived of liberty, which
are not limited to situations where people are in prisons or other

26. See generally Martin Scheinin, COVID-19 Symposium: To Derogate or Not
to Derogate?, OPINIOJURIS (June 4, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/06/covid19-symposium-to-derogate-or-not-to-derogate.
27. Richard Smith, The Margin of Appreciation and Human Rights Protection
in the ‘War on Terror’: Have the Rules Changed before the European Court of
Human Rights?, 8 ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 124, 126–27 (2011),
http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V8N1/Smith.pdf.
28. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article
4: Derogations During a State of Emergency,
¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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detention facilities.31 This can also happen in the context of hospitals
or psychiatric institutions in which the state has taken restrictive
measures regarding individuals so that these persons are effectively
under the custody of the State. Furthermore, other situations of
detention include migrants in custody of the authorities, where the
pandemic has prolonged their detention beyond what is reasonable
and proportional for their circumstances.32 In this regard, when
designing an international instrument on pandemics, an effort should
be made to articulate and align this instrument with some existing
international and national bodies such as the mechanisms established
by the Optional Protocol to the U.N. Convention Against Torture
(CAT), which created the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(SPT) with a mandate to perform visits to state parties’ places of
detention and report on such visits, including medical facilities where
persons are deprived of liberty.33
This Protocol also establishes the obligation of states to create a
National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) with the main purpose of
performing periodic visits to places of detention.34 This domestic
NPM is a very useful tool that articulates its mandate with the work
of the Sub-Committee on the international level.35 I believe the tools
that exist in the context of international human rights treaties, such as
the Optional Protocol, should be taken into account when designing
an international instrument on pandemics that could benefit from
coordination in the relevant area in which they can make
contributions. A lot has happened in the last few decades, and this is
one of the interesting international developments that should be kept
in mind when designing an international instrument on pandemics.
31. See, e.g., OAS: RIGHTS OF PERSONS DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY AND TO
PREVENT AND COMBAT TORTURE, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/default.asp
(last visited Apr. 22, 2021).
32. See, e.g., ABA: IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/immigration/immigrationupdates/impact-of-covid-19-on-the-immigration-system (last visited Apr. 22,
2021).
33. Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, 2375 U.N.T.S. 262.
34. Id. art. 3.
35. Id.
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Regarding the content itself, let me mention that the treaty bodies
have not met in Geneva since the outbreak of the COVID-19
pandemic.36 However, this does not mean that work has stalled.
Rather, work is being completed through many of the tools provided
for in the treaty body mechanisms—including the U.N. Committee
Against Torture, where I have the honor of being a member.37 We
have seen statements from several of the treaty bodies regarding the
content of relevant human rights provisions in their corresponding
conventions.38 Furthermore, in approaching the specific issues that
have been mentioned in this event, decisions in individual
complaintsare going to be important tools to inform about applicable
standards that will have to be taken into account in an international
instrument on pandemics. It will take some time to see such
decisions, but treaty bodiesare indeed receiving complaints that deal
with these very important issues in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic.39
Additionally, I would like to mention that many of the treaty
bodies and the Committee Against Torture are including in the list of
issues prepared for the state reports to specifically include
information about the measures that have been adopted in the context
36. See Committee against Torture Opens Seventieth Online Session, MIRAGE
NEWS (Apr. 27, 2021, 12:12AM), https://www.miragenews.com/committeeagainst-torture-opens-seventieth-549654/ (describing how the suspension of inperson meetings of both the Committee against Torture and other human rights
bodies had slowed down their work).
37. See id. (noting that despite the inefficiencies posed by the suspension of inperson meetings, treaty bodies had completed twenty-seven States party reviews,
thirty-nine concluding observations, and 239 views and decisions related to
individual communications).
38. UN torture prevention body: COVID-19 shows need to strengthen national
preventative
mechanisms,
U.N.
NEWS
(July
2,
2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26031
&LangID=E; Governments must do more to prevent slavery and exploitation
during
COVID-19
pandemic,
U.N.
NEWS
(Nov.
30,
2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26552
&LangID=E.
39. See generally UNITED NATIONS, COVID-19 AND HUMAN RIGHTS: WE ARE
ALL
IN
THIS
TOGETHER
(Apr.
2020),
https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un_policy_brief_on_human_rights_and_
covid_23_april_2020.pdf (describing the myriad ways in which the COVID-19
pandemic threatens human rights, thus raising the specter of potential violations).
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of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly on the impact these
measures have had on specific vulnerable groups. For example, CAT
is focusing on persons deprived of liberty, situations of confinement
in homes for the elderly, hospitals, and institutions for persons with
mental and psychosocial disabilities.40 The concluding observations
that CAT will adopt in these reviews are going to be important
sources of nuanced and specific information of good practices and
problems regarding the implementation of these international
obligations in the context of the current pandemic.

40. UNCAT, supra note 10.

